vloqsouls 2025-09-07 01:52 a.m.MINUTE ORDER
This Court, sua sponte, raised an objection over subject matter jurisdiction regarding over whether this Court had the jurisdiction to preside over FOIA petitions formally denied by agencies within the meaning of 4 M.S.C. 5 § 5313. This order does not seek to wholly address the merits of the FOIA petition.
In interpreting statutes, this Court must conform to "the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et al., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). More simply, this Court "must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
The text of 4 M.S.C. 5 § 5313 provides that "[s]hould a State Agency fail to respond to a FOIA request, then the FOIA requester may petition a court to order the release of the file(s) within 24 hours, unless the file(s) fall under an aforementioned exemption." Ordinarily, the phrase "fail to respond" means non-communication—that is, no acknowledgement or any indication of what the sender wishes to do. However, "general terms should be so limited in
their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will
always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character." United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486–487 (1868).
It is clear that interpreting the statute in its most literal sense would strip the teeth and enforceability of Mayflower's FOIA; government agencies would be able to categorically deny all FOIA petitions using one of the aforementioned statutory exceptions to disclosure with no basis for review.